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9 August 1962

Mr. Roger Hilman  
Director of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Roger:

Just to keep the record straight, I have the following comments on your internal memorandum, "Alertness of U. S. Intelligence Agencies to Berlin Developments."

The important item you omitted was the fact that the National Indications Center, which is in fact the staff of the Watch Committee, operates on a 24-hour-a-day basis in furtherance of its mission responsibilities as assigned by USIB. It is regretted that the three slots, designated to be filled by the State Department, remain unfilled. I note in your paragraph 1 that the State Department "has a 24-hour watch procedure which studies all sources for indications of Soviet bloc actions and intentions." This is exactly what the National Indications Center is charged with doing and I urge that you consider assigning some of your alert people to fill the urgent requirement for State representation in the National Indications Center. You may consider this the third formal insertion of the 14-inch needle.

One further comment -- I feel reasonably certain that the entire intelligence community (in connection with your paragraph 2) has alerted their overseas posts to be on a similar alert -- we in the Central Intelligence Agency have of course done so.

Yours in the faith, and

Faithfully yours,

15/ Pat

Marshall A. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy Director


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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

AUG 7 1962

TO : BTF - Mr. Hillenbrand  
FROM : INR - Roger Hilsman *Rog Hilsman*  
SUBJECT: Alertness of U.S. Intelligence Agencies to Berlin Developments

*These should be working in NIC*

In recent weeks increasing indications of possible Soviet initiatives on Berlin have led the intelligence community to take a number of special alert measures in addition to the standard watch procedures. A summary of both the old and the new alert measures follows.

1. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department has a 24-hour watch procedure which studies all sources for indications of Soviet bloc actions and intentions; appropriate analysts are on 24-hour call.

2. The State Department has instructed key posts to be on the alert for, and to report promptly, any evidence of Soviet diplomatic activity which may foreshadow signature of a separate peace treaty. *CIA Hilsman*

3. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research provides continuing intelligence support for the Berlin Task Force and reviews its assessment of Soviet intentions on a weekly basis.

4. All agencies in the intelligence community maintain 24-hour watches which follow Berlin developments intensively and NSA has been asked to be especially alert to early indications of possible Soviet or East German moves.

5. The USIB Watch Committee has been considering Berlin issues regularly at its weekly meetings and is prepared to convene at any time to consider indications of an impending crisis. *NIC*

6. The members of the intelligence community's Berlin working group are in constant communication in evaluating incoming information and the group is prepared to meet at any time to assess current developments.

7. The Special National Intelligence Estimate of Soviet intentions which was prepared on July 25 is under continuing review and will be promptly updated as soon as this becomes necessary.

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Through effective liaison arrangements with the foreign intelligence services, U.S. agencies abroad receive their reports on Berlin. These reports are promptly transmitted to Washington and are carefully reviewed by the U.S. intelligence community. In the past, some of the material on Berlin received from foreign services, particularly the West German intelligence service, has evidently been planted by communist sources for "war of nerves" purposes. The recent West German report of a 20-point plan on Berlin may well be a case in point.

It must be noted, however, that all the U.S. intelligence effort does not protect us from possible surprises. Such local actions as, e.g., harassments in the air corridors, association of East Germans with Soviet officials in control over access routes, or actions against rail service to Berlin, could be taken by the Soviet Union and the GDR with little or no warning. On the other hand, the Soviet Union will probably prepare for the signature of a separate peace treaty in a deliberate and public fashion; we are likely to have advance word of Soviet diplomatic activity prior to a peace conference and we believe that the Soviets will issue invitations to a "formal" peace conference before signing a separate peace treaty.

At the USIB meeting August 8 I will again raise the question of intelligence community alertness on Berlin and suggest that each agency consider whether further steps need to be taken to improve the state of alertness.

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